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Constitutional Law 






Blockchain technology is now hitting the mainstream. Digital 
currencies based on blockchain architecture, such as Bitcoin and 
Ethereum, are growing in acceptance, and major corporations are 
using blockchains to store troves of data from their devices, supply 
chains, and services. But what is a “blockchain?” And what, if 
anything, does the Fourth Amendment have to do with it? This 
Chapter answers those questions for lawyers, scholars, and judges.  
 
How Does It Work? 
 
Blockchain (or “distributed ledger technology”) is a digital 
architecture for a community of users to keep data on an open, 
shared, and highly tamper-resistant common ledger.2 Blockchains 
can both store information and create mediums of exchange, such 
as digital “coins” transferrable over the ledger. The central 
purpose of blockchain is to store and exchange data while making 
tampering and fraud all but impossible—but in a new, 
revolutionary way. In the physical world, information and 
valuables are secured through exclusion and secrecy: guarded 
 
1 Excerpted and adapted from Paul Belonick, Transparency is the New 
Privacy: Blockchain’s Challenge for the Fourth Amendment, 23 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 114 (2020). 
2 Good resources on blockchain include Jean Bacon, Johan David 
Michels, Christopher Millard & Jatinder Singh, Blockchain Demystified: 
A technical and legal introduction to distributed and centralised ledgers, 
25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 21 (2018); Michael Nielsen, How the Bitcoin 
Protocol Actually Works, DATA DRIVEN INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 6, 2013); 
Regional Organized Crime Information Center, Bitcoin and 
Cryptocurrencies, Law Enforcement Investigative Guide 6–7 (2018) 
[ROCIC Report]; KEVIN WERBACH, THE BLOCKCHAIN AND THE NEW 
ARCHITECTURE OF TRUST 91 (2018); Dylan J. Yaga, Peter M. Mell, Nik 
Roby & Karen Scarfone, Blockchain Technology Overview, NISTIR 
8202 iv (Oct. 2018). 
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repositories, secured servers, passwords, locks, etc. Blockchain’s 
radical insight is that in the right digital circumstances, things 
shared and seen among a network of anonymous strangers can be 
more secure from alteration and censorship than things kept 
private and hidden.  
Five main features of blockchain’s open, shared architecture 
create this novel level of security.3 First, the ledger is kept across 
numerous computers and is updated simultaneously, creating 
multiple backups.  
Second, the integrity of the ledger is protected not by a private 
reconciliation agent like a bank but by a process of sharing. Parties 
who want to exchange data on the ledger propose their 
transactions to “validating” computers on the network, which earn 
the right to publish the exchange on the ledger by solving complex 
mathematical problems that require immense computing power.4 
Once the validator wins the right to publish, it is rewarded for 
validating proper transactions with “coins” or other incentives. 
But if the validator attempts to publish improper or fraudulent 
transactions, the community of computers—which can review all 
accounts on the open ledger—rejects the validation, to the great 
lost energy and time of the validator.  
Third, the data, when exchanged, are digitally scrambled (“h-
ashed”) by algorithmic formulas called “keys” into randomized 
strings of characters called “digests,” which can be unscrambled 
only by someone with a paired key. Decoding the digests without 
the keys by trial and error would take billions of years, even for 
powerful supercomputers.5 Digests make data tampering evident: 
a change of one character in even massive amounts of underlying 
data generates a visibly different digest when hashed. Thus, while 
final transactions on a blockchain are published uncoded on the 
ledger, keys and digests make data hacking and fraud in transit all 
but impossible.  
 
3 These are general features; different blockchain protocols vary in detail. 
ROCIC Report, supra note 2, at 7.  
4 In some blockchain architectures, the validator has to “stake” some 
cryptocurrency to win the right to publish. WERBACH, supra note 2, at 
57. The point is the same: to force the validator to take a serious risk of 
loss if the other network members reject the proposed transaction.  
5 Patrick Nohe, What is 256-bit Encryption? How Safe is It?, 
HASHEDOUT (May 2, 2019). 
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Fourth, blockchains use traditional privacy in a unique way. 
Blockchain users have two keys: a public key shared with others, 
and a private key known only to an individual user that alone can 
unscramble digests created by the user’s public key. Owners of 
data identify themselves on a blockchain by anonymous digital 
“addresses” associated with their public key and their data on the 
ledger. Dual keys and addresses create data security even among 
anonymous strangers: counterparties “sign” proposed transactions 
by showing that they can unscramble test data scrambled by their 
public keys, which shows that they are the true owners of the data 
on the ledger associated with their digital addresses. Anyone can 
read the data being exchanged among parties on the ledger, but 
perfect strangers can be assured that their anonymous 
counterparties indeed own what the open ledger says they do, 
while everyone’s real-world identity can remain hidden.6  
Fifth, openness and distribution—as opposed to secrecy and 
exclusion—create blockchain’s data security. Validating 
computers layer proposed transactions into algorithmic “chains” 
of “blocks” (ledger entries) of data. Each block has two parts: the 
stored ledger data within the block (the “payload”), and the 
“header,” a digest that identifies the block. The header is derived 
from hashing together the data in the payload, some identifying 
data, proof of solving the complex puzzle, and the header of the 
previous block, which was created in the same way using the 
header of its predecessor, and so on backwards. A block’s header 
is thus rooted mathematically in every previous block of data, and 
then roots the header of every later block.  
Once a validating computer proposes to publish a block, other 
computers on the network review the block and can “accept” it by 
hashing the next proposed block to it and updating the rest of the 
network on the “shared state” of the ledger. Hence, the network 
collectively builds a chain of blocks mathematically connected by 
header digests:7  
 
 
6 ROCIC Report, supra note 2, at 3; Yaga et al., supra note 2, at 11. 
7 Image from Yaga et al., supra note 2, at 17.  
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The upshot is that once network consensus joins a block to the 
ledger chain, any change to the block’s payload, even a single 
character, will automatically algorithmically change the header 
digest of its block radically, creating a ripple effect in all the linked 
headers down the chain.8  
Every computer viewing the open copy of the ledger could 
observe that effect.9 Distribution and openness thus make 
blockchain data “tamper evident.” More so, distribution and 
openness make the chain “tamper resistant”: the only way to alter 
a block’s data once it is on the ledger chain is to try to “republish” 
it and then “revalidate” every following block in sequence from 
the altered block up to the present.10 But that would require 
impossibly phenomenal (and exponentially increasing) amounts 
of computing power to solve those complex validation puzzles in 
time to beat out all the legitimate blocks that other validators are 
adding to the end of the ledger chain—all to no avail once the 
changes are detected and rejected by the group consensus 
anyway.11 The one sure way to get away with fraud or censorship 
is to own 51% of the computing power of the network so that one 
could self-validate any transaction and repeatedly hash blocks on 
top of it ahead of other validators no matter who objected. But that 
 
8 Id.  
9 Id. Rejected blocks are ignored and not built upon; the longest chain of 
blocks thus becomes the architecturally visible consensus of the network, 
plain to all, an agreed “state of information.” Peter Hurich, The Virtual 
is Real: An Argument for Characterizing Bitcoins as Private Property, 
31 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 573, 577 (2016).  
10 Bacon et al., supra note 2, at 17.  
11 Nielsen, supra note 2.  
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feat becomes computationally unattainable once a blockchain 
network gets large enough.12  
Hence, blockchain data records are, for all intents and 
purposes, immutable. All users can see data on the ledger but—in 
part for that very reason—can’t do anything to change them, steal 
them, censor them, or to dupe others into accepting fraudulent 
offers of them. No central reconciliation mechanisms or costly 
fraud protections are needed. Mathematical laws and visibility to 
a large community of computers together create “structured 
transparency” that secures against fraud and manipulation to an 
extent that other computing methods or physical world means 
based on secrecy and exclusion cannot match. The technology is 
amazingly powerful: In a test to discover which farm had supplied 
Wal-Mart a particular package of mangoes, conventional tracking 
mechanisms identified the supplier within a week; blockchain 
took two seconds.13 For this reason, blockchain enthusiasts 
(perhaps a bit too animatedly) claim that blockchains will create 
frictionless exchanges of information and value that will 
transform economies, governments, and perhaps all human 
relations.14 
But there is a downside to security by transparency: with the 
growth of blockchains as widely used personal payment and 
enterprise data-management tools, millions of everyday actions 
and transactions will be recorded permanently, leaving digital 
traces of people’s interactions on ledgers that are immutable 
and—to varying degrees—visible. Mass surveillance will never 
have been easier. 
 
Blockchain and the Fourth Amendment 
 
How should Fourth Amendment caselaw react? I propose 
engaging blockchain thoughtfully, considering first how some 
settled Fourth Amendment doctrines might apply to blockchain’s 
 
12 Several hundred of the world’s fastest supercomputers combined could 
not manage this feat in the Bitcoin network. Kevin Werbach, Trust, but 
Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the Law, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
487, 513–14 (2018).  
13 WERBACH, supra note 2, at 83.  
14 Id. at 91.  
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features.15 For instance, many blockchain users likely harbor 
reasonable expectations of privacy in keeping their identities 
cryptographically shrouded16 and in keeping their private keys—
which often enough are stored in private computers in digital 
folders called “wallets”—private.17 Current doctrine thus might be 
adequate for criminal investigations seeking to search a suspect’s 
computer for their private key to match them to transactions, or 
for investigations that use complex computing systems not in 
general public use to try to deanonymize users.18  
Yet, in large part because of the mass-surveillance problem, 
blockchain also forces a reckoning with current Fourth 
Amendment caselaw’s shortcomings. Courts should start by 
recognizing that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence historically 
has depended on proxies—such as property and privacy—to 
uphold the textual right to be “secure” from unreasonable 
government intrusion. Technology has repeatedly forced those 
proxies to shift; as new investigative tools expanded the invasive 
powers of the government over the past century, for instance, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence changed focus from a property-
based “trespass theory” to the current “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” theory covering everything from tapped phone 
conversations19 to the “whole of one’s physical movements” in 
space as tracked by one’s cell phone.20 Further shifts are expected 
as the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has become subject 
to biting criticism as confusing, subjective, and atextual, and (as 
 
15 Caselaw is as yet rare. But see United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 
307 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that the defendant lacked a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in blockchain data).  
16 Notably, regulators have proposed deanonymization for certain 
blockchain transactions. See, e.g., 85 Fed. Reg. 83,840 (Dec. 23, 2020).  
17 ROCIC Report, supra note 2, at 15.  
18 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth 
Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1325, 1329 (2002) (“Kyllo suggests that government use of new 
technologies should always be subject to the warrant requirement unless 
they are in general public use.”). People who willingly expose their 
identities or who are readily identifiable with methods currently 
available to law enforcement would, of course, fall under current 
doctrine.  
19 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
20 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).  
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technology becomes more searching and total “privacy” becomes 
ever more impossible) apt to turn the Fourth Amendment into a 
“dead letter.”21 The Supreme Court’s latest pronouncements in 
such cases as Carpenter v. United States22 and Riley v. 
California23 especially portend change as technology further 
advances; several justices now focus directly on government 
overreach and are ready to abandon the privacy proxy. It appears 
time to move on.  
Blockchain’s revolutionary architecture may prove the 
vehicle for this next shift. To start, blockchain starkly exposes 
some of the illogic of the “privacy” regime. In particular, it 
challenges the third-party doctrine, which declares that an 
(atextual) reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus Fourth 
Amendment protection) is lost in anything shared with another 
person, making “privacy” tantamount to total secrecy. In the 
physical world, this proxy makes tolerable sense: historians have 
shown that the desire for security against government intrusion 
that inspired the Fourth Amendment was commensurate with the 
desire for security against private parties’ trespasses on private 
property that resulted in damage or unauthorized use.24 It follows 
that efforts to keep something “secure” against neighbors should 
apply equally to the government,25 and, in the physical world, that 
naturally means hiding things we want kept safe. In the digital 
world, however, total secrecy is quickly growing unrealistic.  
Because most blockchain data are shared on an open network, 
they would seemingly lose all Fourth Amendment protection 
 
21 See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in A World Without 
Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309, 1320 (2012).  
22 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
23 573 U.S. 373 (2014).  
24 Maureen E. Brady, The Lost “Effects” of the Fourth Amendment: 
Giving Personal Property Due Protection, 125 YALE L.J. 946, 951–52 
& n.13, 987–94 (2016). Brady’s point makes good historical sense: 
regular police forces did not exist in the 18th century, and fellow citizens 
were the main investigators and enforcers of public order. William J. 
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 424 (1995).  
25 Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 110 (2008) 
(“[T]hat which we have exposed to perfect strangers, we cannot claim to 
be private. . . . To the extent we have opened something otherwise private 
to a perfect stranger, the police may intrude into it as well.”).  
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under the third-party doctrine. Yet courts should not react in a 
knee-jerk manner. To start, blockchain’s mind-bending 
architecture confounds Fourth Amendment doctrine’s basic 
private/public, inside/outside logic: is the digital address, for 
instance, unprotected “non-content” like a physical address on a 
letter, or protected “content” like the inside of a letter in that it 
communicates the critical facts that the user is legitimate and an 
offer authentic? Is the visible data payload like the “inside” of an 
envelope and the anonymous address like the “outside,” or the 
reverse? Standard physical-world analogies and the doctrines they 
support collapse in this novel digital space.  
The third-party doctrine is already extremely unpopular, 
especially among the current justices. Carpenter leaves the 
doctrine on “life support,”26 holding that the doctrine does not 
apply to data taken from “indispensable” modern devices or to 
“comprehensive” records of one’s movements. Carpenter has 
direct implications for blockchain: blockchain is approaching 
indispensable and ubiquitous status as more businesses and people 
adopt it. And the comprehensive nature of blockchain data taken 
from, say, self-driving cars or the internet-of-things may give the 
Court pause. Indeed, Carpenter insisted that the Fourth 
Amendment “take account of more sophisticated systems that are 
already in use or in development.”27 Most pressingly, Carpenter 
goes beyond mere proxies to focus directly on “basic Fourth 
Amendment concerns about arbitrary government power.”28 
Clinging to the third-party doctrine in the face of growing 
blockchain use would run afoul of the Court’s warnings, 
permitting governments to inspect at whim blockchain records for 
decades’ worth of information about people’s daily lives.  
Blockchain forces consideration of whether privacy and 
secrecy might, like the property proxy of old, be incomplete 
proxies for other vital human ends, including both security from 
intrusion protected by the Fourth Amendment and free-speech and 
free-association rights protected by the First Amendment. 
Censorship resistance and free information flow are a large part of 
blockchain’s raison d’être.29 Chinese citizens, for instance, are 
 
26 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2272 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
27 Id. at 2218 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).  
28 Id. at 2222.  
29 WERBACH, supra note 2, at 158.  
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using Ethereum-based blockchains to circumvent government 
expurgation of the news.30 Blockchain’s immutable ledger and 
cryptographic anonymity can help keep speech robust and open 
by being both sharable and resistant to censorship, fulfilling a 
critical human end without relying on total privacy. Blockchain 
also increases personal autonomy—what Justice Brandeis once 
called the “right to be let alone”31—by reducing reliance on 
external actors like banks and governments. But blockchain serves 
these vital ends by abandoning, not by relying on, Fourth 
Amendment-style privacy and secrecy. 
Because the goals formerly protected by secrecy can now, 
though blockchain, be protected by openness, distribution, and 
mathematics, doctrine must shift again. A new paradigm can 
ensure that blockchain data tied to personal autonomy enjoy 
Fourth Amendment security against unreasonable searches, even 
for shared or public data.  
The new paradigm should focus on the individual’s level of 
control over the subject of the search. Under this schema, a user’s 
true identity and private keys would be classified as fully 
controlled information, relinquished to no one, and would have 
full Fourth Amendment protection. Data held by private consortia 
would be considered fully controlled as to those that keep them. 
Data posted to a blockchain to ensure security and to prevent 
damage, theft, or loss would be considered semi-controlled 
because of a clear interest in their integrity and security, even if 
they have been posted to an open chain. Individuals who create 
data by living their lives with a blockchain-associated device 
should by default retain a semi-controlled interest in the integrity 
of their personal data, absent clear indicia that the individuals 
purposely relinquished the data for general public consumption. 
By contrast, truly public data on a blockchain, clearly released for 
public consumption (that is, not put on the chain merely to gain 
 
30 Nir Kshetri, Chinese internet users turn to the blockchain to fight 
against government censorship, THECONVERSATION.COM (Feb. 25, 
2019). The Chinese government is fighting back, attempting to regulate 
all blockchain use in China. Yogita Khatri, China’s Internet Censor to 
Start Regulating Blockchain Firms Next Month, COINDESK (Jan. 10, 
2019). The denouement remains to be seen.  
31 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
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the advantages of secured transaction) would be considered 
relinquished.  
Data with the lowest level of control—publicly relinquished 
blockchain data—should have no Fourth Amendment protection. 
Semi-controlled data should be subject to the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard. Fully controlled data would require full 
Fourth Amendment protection of probable cause and a warrant. 
These distinctions based on level of control are implicit in the 
Fourth Amendment’s textual promise to the people of their right 
to be secure in “their” persons, houses, papers, and effects. 
Further, the distinction can be applied without reference to 
atextual and abstract notions of privacy or secrecy or to the 
circularity of Katz’s “expectations.”32  
What the schema would not permit would be large-scale 
scans, mass surveillance, or pure fishing expeditions into ledger 
data based on hunches alone. Government officials therefore 
could not cast a dragnet over semi-controlled data at their 
pleasure; they would need to articulate some clear reason for 
analyzing the data and for focusing on any given individual. For 
instance, law enforcement might narrow in on a suspect, and, 
acting on an articulable suspicion that the suspect might be 
engaging in cryptocurrency transactions for goods in certain 
amounts at certain times, review a chain in a targeted way for 
specific clues.  
Ironically, this approach to the 21st century’s latest 
technology shows how the 18th-century text’s focus on 
ownership, control, and fear of general warrants may be a better 
means to achieving “security” against the government than 
privacy-as-secrecy. Textualists, including some current justices, 
have suggested scotching the atextual reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test in favor of a simpler test in which a defendant’s 
records are protected from searches that are unreasonable to the 
extent that they resemble the old general warrants or writs of 
assistance that permitted the king to search as he wished. Perusal 
of an open, immutable blockchain similarly could instantly reveal 
years of activities, edging closer to “near perfect surveillance.”33 
 
32 Police investigation into the public material might, of course, raise 
traditional First Amendment censorship or chilling concerns exacerbated 
by the immutable ledger.  
33 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210.  
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This view can work with my proposal: a bit of blockchain data 
is a modern-day paper owned and at least partially controlled by 
its creator. An attempt by the government to learn about those data 
should constitute a plain-meaning search. Such a search becomes 
more unreasonable, in historical terms, the broader its sweep is. 
On a blockchain, an unrestrained search of controlled or semi-
controlled data could be broad indeed. Blockchain shows how the 





 In sum, the proposed standard would advance judicial and 
scholarly critiques of current doctrine, be rooted in the Fourth 
Amendment’s text and history, and strike a reasonable balance in 
a new digital context among the need for society to deter crime, 
the reality that blockchains pose a challenge for criminal 
investigation, the people’s interests in their data, and the fear of 
general warrants and mass surveillance. Distributed ledgers 
should catalyze a developed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
that eschews proxies and focuses on text, history, security, 
autonomy, control, and defense against the accumulation of 
overweening government power. 
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